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♣ In recent years, troubled by the claims of many in macroeconomic theory on the importance, indeed the 
necessity, of numerical algorithms to solve analytically intractable problems, I have felt the need to return to the 
noble tradition of analog computing. There is no better way to do this than through a thorough understanding of 
the meaning and aims with which Phillips constructed his hydraulic analog computing machine. Conversations 
with my friend and colleague Stefano Zambelli and our graduate students, Kao Selda and V. Ragupathy have, as 
always, been edifying. Alas, they are not responsible for the remaining infelicities. This draft paper was 
prepared for presentation at the conference to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Phillips Machine, 7/8 
December, 2010. Analog and analogue have been used in slightly different senses that should be clear from the 
context! Abstract
In this paper I try to argue for the desirability of analog computation in eco-
nomics from a variety of perspectives, using the example of the Phillips Machine.
Ultimately, a case is made for the underpinning of both analog and digital com-
puting theory in constructive mathematics. Some conceptual confusion in the
meaning of analog computing and its non-reliance on the theory of numerical
analysis is also discussed.
21 Notes on the Phillips Machine as an Analog
Computer
"If a single group of equations can be written which de￿nes the
assumed performance for two separate systems (each of which within
itself represents an orderly or de￿nable behavior), one system may
be called the complete analogue of the other."
[26], p. 557; italics added
In the case of the Phillips Machine, a paradigmatic analog computing device,
this reasonable de￿nition leads to a peculiar dissonance. Phillips observes, quite
correctly and perceptively, that:
"The hydraulic model [the Phillips Machine] will give solutions
for non-linear systems as easily as for linear ones. It is not even
necessary for the relationships to be in analytic form; so long as the
curves can be drawn the machine will record the correct solutions,
within the limits of its accuracy1. In giving the equivalent mathe-
matical model, however, the usual linearity assumption will be made,
in view of the di¢ culty of working with non-linear di⁄erential or dif-
ference equations."
[21], pp. 287-8; italics added
Why is it necessary to give ￿ the equivalent mathematical model￿? Obvi-
ously the de￿nition of analogue, given in [26], above, is predicated upon the
construction (or, is it the existence) of ￿ a group of equations￿de￿ning ￿ the as-
sumed performance for two separate system￿ . But is it not possible to de￿ne
￿ analogue computation￿ 2 in the same sense in which the intutitive notion of ef-
fective calculability was, eventually, encapsulated in the de￿nition of a Turing
Machine? If the analogue computing machine, such as the Phillips Machine, was
constructed ￿from an engineering point of view ￿on the basis of economic prin-
ciples, whether in mathematical form or not, then its functioning should mirror
the performance of the economy of which it is a ￿ model￿ . The intermediary
stage of constructing ￿ a group of equations￿raises a whole host of foundational
questions ￿in addition to the serious problem of the meaning of ￿ model￿to be
used here ￿that have not been faced, squarely or otherwise, in the analogue
tradition of computation, except in relation to recursion theory3.
1By this Phillips must mean engineering precision limits to accuracy, as well as, the usual
constraints due to the need to respect the laws of the natural sciences in the manufacturing
of machine components. ￿ Limits of its accuracy￿has nothing to do with usual ￿nite precision
constraints of a digital computer, nor with the problems of numerical analysis (discretizations,
etc.).
2I think the inadequacy of the de￿nition in [26] is primarily due to the absence of the qual-
ifying notion of ￿ computation￿ . We are, at least in the present context, concerned essentially
with computation by analogue machines ￿just as we would be concerned with computation
by digital machines, if we were using Turing Machines, or its approximations.
3See the companion piece to this one, [33].
3The ￿ foundational questions￿I am referring to are mostly mathematical and
metamathematical in nature. What kind of mathematics should be used in the
setting up of the ￿ group of equations￿? In the case of the digital computer there
is, by now, a clear, rigorous, answer to a similar question: recursion theory or
constructive mathematics. In the case of analogue computation it may appear
as if one can rely on standard mathematics for setting up the relevant ￿ group
of equations￿ . This, however, is an untenable answer, but I will not go into the
philosophical or epistemological foundations of the mathematical foundations
of analogue computation in this paper (although, as mentioned in the previous
footnote, I have tried to do so in the companion piece to this paper).
More importantly, a characteristically perceptive observation made by Richard
Goodwin, in his review of Alan Tustin￿ s pioneering servomechanism-based ap-
proach to modelling analogue computation in economics, is directly relevant for
the issues I am trying to raise:
"After an introductory defense of using [the very powerful analyt-
ical tools of servomechanism engineering] .. in economics, Professor
Tustin launches into a lucid exposition of the basic concepts and
methods of what has come to be known as the operational calculus.
... It is here that he employs graphical analysis with outstanding
success. This emphasis on graphics has a special justi￿cation in
that economics, like engineering, must work with raw material given
in the form of empirical curves."
[11], p.209; italics added.
This is a refreshingly original view and in stark contrast to the indiscrimi-
nate assumptions of economic data being de￿ned on, and generated from, un-
countable, uncomputable, undecidable domains. The versatility and power of
the Phillips Machine, as an analog computer, is precisely the feature that is
emphasised here by Goodwin, re￿ ecting the method￿ s importance in Tustin￿ s
parallel ￿servomechanism-based ￿approach to anlogue modelling and analog
computation in economics.
The epistemology and philosophy of analogue modelling, in its almost pure
mathematical senses, is a question that has to be addressed separately. As far
as I am concerned, the Phillips Machine is an analogue computing device ￿
although I am well aware that there was more to its construction than as a
repository of mechanisms to facilitate computation.
But why did Phillips decide to build his machine with ￿mainly ￿hydraulic
components and on hydraulic principles?4 After all, Phillips himself was a
trained, experienced, electrical engineer and he could have built a servomechanism-
type of analog computer, if the sole purpose was pure computation. To place the
4In a typically hair-splitting, pointless,discussion about Coddington￿ s use of the phrase
￿ hydraulic Keynesianism￿ , Patinkin ([20], footnote 8) makes all sorts of allusions and invokes
utterly senseless references and correspondence with all and sundry - without taking the
trouble, so far as I can infer, to actually read the Phillips paper of 1950. The most astonishing
absurdity is a reference to Shackle￿ s phrase ￿ reduction of economics to hydraulics￿([24], p.189),
and the quite unbelievable conjectures about how he (Shackle) came to construct it.
4above notes, and this question, in the context of the way Phillips himself admit-
ted were the inspirations for the construction of a hydraulic analogue computing
device, it may be useful to recall what he wrote on this point:
"Fundamentally, the problem is to design and build a machine
the operations of which can be described by a particular system of
equations which it may be found useful to set up as the hypothe-
ses of a mathematical model, in other words, a calculating machine
for solving di⁄erential equations. Since, however, the machines are
intended for exposition rather than accurate calculation, a second
requirement is that the whole of the operations should be clearly vis-
ible and comprehensible to the onlooker. For this reason hydraulic
methods have been used in preference to electronic ones which might
have given greater accuracy and ￿ exibility, the machines being made
of transparent plastic (￿ Perspex￿ ) tanks and tubes, through which is
pumped coloured water.
Both of the models mentioned above deal with macroeconomic
theory in terms of money ￿ ows; but they are based on an analogy
given by Professor Boulding to show how the production ￿ ow, stocks
and price of a commodity may react on one another."
[21], pp. 283-4; italics added.
Just for the record, I copy here, as Figure 1, the relevant ￿gure and section
in Boulding￿ s vintage text on Economic Analysis (third edition, [5], p. 1075).
His co-constructor, Walter Newlyn, in his interesting chapter on The Origin of
the Machine ([19], pp. 31-2) is more speci￿c:
"[Phillips￿ ] Figure 3 [in ￿ Saving and Investment : Rate of In-
terest and Level of Income￿] shows Boulding￿ s supply and demand
hydraulic analogy (1948, p.117) modi￿ed for the inclusion of stocks
and the interconnections between stocks and ￿ ows linked mechani-
cally"6
Even a cursory comparison of FIG 2 in [21], p.285 with the ￿gure in Bould-
ing would show that the former is inspired by the latter, in the precise senses
5Phillips refers to p. 117 in an earlier edition of the Boulding book (p. 284).
6Incidentally, there is a curious unscholarly ￿ aside￿in this otherwise interesting narrative of
￿ The Origin of the Machine in a Personal Context￿ , when Newlyn suggests that the ￿ inclusion￿
of the accelerator ￿ in the Mark II machines is the element which gave it the dynamic feature
which stimulated the work of Ricard Goodwin ￿a far cry from being a teaching aid.￿ This
unfortunate inaccuracy is triply wrong, First of all, Phillips was inspired by the article on
the ￿ accelerator￿ , by Goodwin, in the Alvin Hansen Festschrift ([8]; [21], footnote 1, p.298).
Secondly, Goodwin had developed the ￿ ￿exible accelerator￿model, that which was published as
the lead article in the ￿rst number of the ￿rst issue of the 1951 volume of the Econometrica,
much earlier than the construction of even the prototype Phillips Machine, in 1949 (cf. [9]).
Thirdly, Goodwin had gone much beyond the classic ￿ ￿exible accelerator￿in his remarkable
review of the book by Hicks on the Trade Cycle ([10]). No models by Phillips ￿ including
those in his celebrated EJ articles of the 1950s ([22], [23]) ￿ever managed to encapsulate the
richness of Goodwin￿ s nonlinear elements. On the other hand, the Phillips Machine could
easily implement the full nonlinear Goodwin model quite easily!
5Figure 1: Boulding￿ s Hydraulic Analogy
in which Phillips and Newlyn suggest. Any perceptive reader of Boulding￿ s
suggestive analogy will realize that he is describing non-steady dynamics, an
euphemism, surely, for nonlinear dynamics. It is strange, then, given the aims
with which Phillips constructed an analog hydraulic computing machine, that
he chose to build a model represented by ￿ a particular system of equations￿that
were linear.
6I should like to end this Introductory section with a few personal remarks on
the role of analogue computation and the Phillips Machine in my own intellectual
history. I was privileged to have been an engineering student, in the department
of mechanical engineering, at Kyoto University, in the transition period when
massive digital computing facilities were becoming available and old-fashioned
wind tunnels were being replaced by simulations of theoretically derived di⁄er-
ential equations on these modern computers. But we were fortunate to have the
bene￿t of the analogue computing tradition being practised and demonstrated
in the analysis and studies of nonlinear dynamics by one of the great masters
of this method and tool: Chihiro Hayashi ([13]). His lectures on electric circuit
theory, with especial emphasis on studying, via analogue computation, the dy-
namics of the van der Pol equation ￿in both forced and unforced forms ￿was
my introduction to this method and its versatility and to the famous equation
itself. Graphical techniques dominated the way Hayashi approached the study
of the intractable forced van der Pol equation ￿presaging and preparing me for
instruction by Richard Goodwin, a few years later, at Cambridge, when this
very equation was now given an extraordinary economic interpretation in terms
of a Keynesian trade cycle model. Goodwin continued the graphical, geometric,
tradition of Hayashi, but also gradually began to move towards representations
of the van der Pol equations in digital computing machines.
Remarkably, when I switched to economics, ￿rst in the department of eco-
nomics at the University of Lund, I came under the wise in￿ uence of Professor
Bj￿rn Thalberg, whose work at that time ￿and for many years earlier and later
￿was based on the contributions by Goodwin and Phillips to the modelling of a
Keynesian vision of the macroeconomy ([28], [29] and [30]. Thalberg had him-
self attended the very ￿rst series of lectures given by Goodwin, at Cambridge,
utilising the Cambridge Phillips Machine, in 1952.
Many years later, my external examiner, for the Cambridge PhD thesis that
I worked on under Goodwin￿ s enlightened guidance, was Sir Roy Allen, whose
successful textbooks of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were among the core ￿ mod-
ern￿texts, in addition to Samuelson￿ s Foundations and Patinkin￿ s Money, In-
terest and Prices, through which I learned macroeconomics in Thalberg￿ s grad-
uate courses, in the early 1970s. No macroeconomic textbook emphasised a
servomechanism-based modelling approach to macroeconomics, using, in par-
ticular, the Phillips and Goodwin dynamic models, than Roy Allen￿ s lucid text-
books of that vintage period (see, for example, [2] and [3]).
That my formative years as a macroeconomist were at the feet of Thalberg
and Goodwin gave me, what I consider to be an immense advantage over many
of the ￿ modernists￿ : to learn and understand a vision of the macroeconomy in
which computation was given crucial interpretive, investigative and theoretical
roles. These were the roles that Phillips emphasised, at least in those classic
early works and constructions, and Goodwin grappled with all his intellectual
life.
72 A Perspective on the Analogue Computing
Tradition in Economics
"The [hydraulic] mechanism just described is the physical ana-
logue of the ideal economic market. The elements which contribute
to the determination of prices are represented each with its appro-
priate r￿le and open to the scrutiny of the eye. We are thus enabled
not only to obtain a clear and analytical picture of the interdepen-
dence of the many elements in the causation of prices, but also to
employ the mechanism as an instrument of investigation and by it,
study some complicated variations which could scarcely be success-
fully followed without its aid."
([7], p.44, italics in original)
Calculating, estimating, comparing, constructing and reasoning with numer-
ical ratios, averages, series, tables areas, volumes and so on ￿in short, ￿ analyzing
data￿ , whether natural or arti￿cial ￿underpinned much inference and some de-
duction is the way our classical and physiocratic predecessors came to policy
precepts. However, with the exception of Charles Babbage and, possibly, Jevons,
till Irving Fisher ([7]), in 1891, constructed his ￿ remarkable hydraulic [analogue
computing] apparatus for calculating equilibrium prices￿([6], p.57,) resorting to
actually constructed machine models of computing in economics seems to have
remained an isolated example. Fisher￿ s own description ￿quoted above ￿of the
functioning of his hydraulic analogue computing machine clari￿es an important
feature of such computations: their independence from any intermediation via
numerical analysis.
There were, of course, the famous computing machine metaphors used by
Walras, Pareto ￿and, then, inspired by Barone, in the important ￿ Socialist Cal-
culation Debate￿ , most comprehensively summarised, both critically and con-
structively by Hayek ([14] & [15]). Lange, returning to the theme over thirty
years later, in his Dobb Festschrift article on The Computer and the Market
([17]), muddied the issue by unscholarly and unsubstantiable claims for the pos-
sibilities of a digital computer (having, in the meanwhile, also forgotten that
the initial discussions were with reference to analog computing machines and, in
particular, the metaphor of the market as an analogue computer). None of the
participants had any technical knowledge of the mathematical underpinnings of
computing, in a sense understandably so, since the mathematical foundations
of computing were being placed on a rigorous basis just during those very years
that the debate was at its height.
Analogue computing techniques in economics had the proverbial still birth.
There was a ￿ urry of activities in the late 1940s and early 1950s, quite apart
from Phillips, at the hands of Richard Goodwin, Herbert.A. Simon, Robert
H.Strotz, Otto Smith, Arnold Tustin, Roy Allen, Oscar Lange and a few oth-
ers. As we know, now, Phillips built his famous MONIAC hydraulic national
income machine at the end of the 40s and it was used at many Universities -
and even at the Central Bank of Guatemala - for teaching purposes and even
8as late as the early 70s Richard Goodwin, at Cambridge University, taught me
elementary principles of coupled market dynamics using such a machine. Strotz
and his associates, at Northwestern University, built electro-analogue machines
to study inventory dynamics and nonlinear business cycle theories of the Hicks-
Goodwin varieties. Otto Smith and R.M. Saunders, at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley, built an electro-analogue machine to study and simulate a
Kalecki-type business cycle model. Roy Allen￿ s successful textbooks on Macro-
economics and Mathematical Economics of the 50s - extending into the late 60s
- contained pedagogical circuit devices modelling business cycle theories (cf:[2]
especially chapter 9; and [3], especially chapter 18). Arnold Tustin￿ s highly
imaginative, but failed textbook attempt to familiarise economists with the use
of servomechanism theory to build analogue machines as models of economic
dynamics ([31]) and Oscar Lange￿ s attractive,elementary, expository book with
a similar purpose ([18]) also su⁄ered the fate of ￿ stillbirth￿ , at the dawn of the
digital computing age.
Humphreys ([16]) refers to nonlinear business cycle theories as examples of
computational ￿ studies￿that straddle ￿ the pre-computational era and the era
of computational economics￿ , claiming that ￿ there is no sharp divide between
￿ the two eras￿ . This claim can be substantiated by a more ￿nessed study of
the particular example of a canonical nonlinear business cycle equation, using
￿as was, indeed, actually done ￿analogue computing machines as in the ￿ pre-
computational era￿and comparing it with its study using a digital computing
machine of the ￿ era of computational economics￿ .
The example I have chosen here encapsulates a noble tradition of computa-
tion in economics in every sense of this concept, to study a precisely speci￿ed
mathematical system on both analogue and digital computers. It is, in a precise
sense, also a substitute for an analytical study (because such a study is prov-
ably ￿ unlikely￿to succeed in any meaningful way). Moreover, it can be viewed
as an explicit example of an epistemological tool to interpret the results (most
of which were unexpected). Finally, to gain insight into the link between a com-
puting machine and its theory and the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems.
The latter point is turning out to be the most signi￿cant from the point of view
of the epistemology of computation, since the interaction can only be explored
by representing the one system by the other ￿and, therefore, even an explo-
ration into a new domain: studying the repertoire of digital machine behaviour
with analogue computing machines, and vice versa.
Consider, therefore, the following equation, representing a classical Keyne-
sian nonlinear multiplier-accelerator model of the dynamics of national income,
y:
￿_ y (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)y (t) = ￿[_ y (t ￿ ￿)] + ￿ (t) + l(t) (1)
Now, there are at least six di⁄erent ways to investigate solutions to this
nonlinear di⁄erence-di⁄erential equation:
￿ In old fashioned analytical modes;
9￿ Using Non-standard analysis;
￿ Graphically, i.e., in terms of the geometry of dynamic behaviour, as usually
done in the qualitative theory of di⁄erential equations;
￿ By the method of equivalent linearization;
￿ Using an electro-analogue computer;
￿ Using digital computers;
It is, of course, only the last two alternatives that are of relevance in this
discussion. Assuming, for example, ￿ (t) + l(t) a constant7 and reinterpreting
y (t) as a deviation from the unstable equilibrium of (1) (
￿(t)+l(t)
(1￿￿) ); one obtains
a mixed nonlinear di⁄erence-di⁄erential equation:
￿_ y (t + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)y (t + ￿) = ￿[_ y (t)] (2)
In the ￿rst case, expanding (2) by a Taylor series approximation and retain-
ing only the ￿rst two terms, one obtained the famous (unforced) Rayleigh (- van








_ x + x = 0 (3)
With this approximated reformulation began an ￿ industry￿in the endoge-
nous theory of the business cycle, where the cardinal desideratum was the ex-
istence of a unique, stable, limit cycle, independent of initial conditions. All
four desiderata were violated when the approximations were more precise ￿in
a purely technical sense ￿and the analysis proceeded via studies by means of
analogue and digital computing machines. Even more interestingly, the insights
obtained from an analogue computing machine study provided hints in setting
up a computing study of (1) by means of digital computing machines.
Now, using an electro-analog computer, it was found, in [27], that the ap-
proximation of (1) retaining the ￿rst four terms of a Taylor series expansion,
generated twenty-￿ve limit cycles, and a potential for a countable in￿nity of limit
cycles with further higher order terms included in the approximations. More-
over, in its original formulation, one of the desired criteria for the nonlinear
formulation of the endogenous model of the business cycle, was to generate self-
sustaining ￿ uctuations, independent of initial conditions. This latter property
was lost when the approximation was made more precise.
Next, coupling two equations of type (3), via the Phillips Electro-Mechanical-
Hydraulic Analogue Computing Machine ([12]), Goodwin and Phillips were able
to generate ￿unexpectedly ￿the quasi-periodic paradox (cf., [1]). Neither Good-
win, nor Phillips, who did the coupled-dynamics computation on the Phillips
7If ￿ (t) + l(t) was not assumed a constant, the obdurate forced version of (3) would have
to be confronted, wihtout any hope of a disciplined solution even with the help of computing
machines, whether analog or digital.
10Machine, had any clue ￿theoretical or otherwise ￿about interpreting and en-
capsulating this outcome in any economic theoretical formalization. The key
point is that they were surprised by the outcome and did not know how to
interpret it when it emerged. This is where the richness of the epistemology of
computation manifests itself most dramatically. There was no macrodynamic
theory to which they could relate the observed behaviour, which was contrary
to expected behaviour.
Finally,￿Zambelli ([34] ￿repeated the exercise in [27], but this time on a
digital computer. His results came as a surprise to him: although we can con￿rm
the results in [27], the outcomes are richer and more varied and we would have
no idea which way to proceed, if one was wedded to an equilibrium norm to
which the results have to conform.
It goes without saying that one of the key di⁄erences between analogue and
digital computing is that in the latter the intermediation between the continuous
and the discrete is achieved by means of numerical procedures; this intermedi-
ation is circumvented in the analogue tradition, as pointed out above. In this
sense, there is a sharp di⁄erence between ￿ the pre-computational era and the
era of computational economics￿ . Much of what is routinely referred to as com-
putational economics in the modern era is simply variations on the theme of
numerical analysis, without any anchoring in the mathematical theory of the
computer, whether digital or analogue.
There is no better way, at least in my opinion, to end this section than to
recall Richard Stone￿ s extraordinarily perceptive re￿ ections on the power and
possibilities of analog computing in the kind of multisectoral macrodynamics he
was then embarking on, summarised in his talk at a Conference on Automatic
Control, as far back as 1951 ([25], pp. 82-3)8:
"Analogue machines are not unknown to economists, but in the
past they have been used for demonstration purposes but not for
computing. Examples of such machines are the hydrostatic model
of general economic exchange described by Irving Fisher in 1892
and subsequently built, and the Phillips-Newlyn Hydraulic model
for demonstrating the interdependence of the main variables in gen-
eral aggregative analysis which was designed a few years ago and
which has now been adopted for expository purposes in a number of
universities in this country. The use of electric analogues has been
suggested recently by various authors, one of these instruments be-
ing concerned with the investigation of inventory oscillations and
another with the investigation of equilibrium among spatially sepa-
rated markets. ....
It is impossible to say without detailed investigation whether
such an approach to economic computing problems have any ad-
8I have suppressed the many references that were in the full quote. Alan Tustin￿ s talk,
immediately after Richard Stone, and published back-to-back with Stone￿ s paper ([32]), is also
worth a perusal and some re￿ection, since, by that time, his own important book ([31]) on a
servomechanism-based approach to analog computation was close to completion.
11vantage over the usual digital methods. Its utility would probably
depend on whether a more detailed investigation of economic re-
sponses revealed patterns for which a good electric analogue could
be devised. Since the machine would be designed to perform calcu-
lations arising from a speci￿ed system it should be easily modi￿able,
since otherwise it would be too rigid for the changing circumstances
of economic life. It goes without saying that should the design of
such a machine be contemplated it would be necessary to introduce
many complications which have not been elaborated here. In par-
ticular there would be a need to consider (i) stocks as well as ￿ ows,
(ii) prices and quantities separately instead of simply their product
...., (iii) exogenous factors .... (iv) expectations .... and ￿nally (v)
the speci￿cation of ..errors. "
Those who are familiar with the Phillips Machine, and its architecture, will
know that from the outset Phillips was concerned with issues (i), (ii) and (iv).
Knowing his general intellectual interests and subsequent work, there is no doubt
at all in my mind that (iii) and (v), too, would have been incorporated in any
modern reconstruction of the Phillips Machine.
3 Analogue Re￿ ections in a Digital World
"[I]t is, therefore, desirable to form some view of the degree of
complexity that may be expected in a ￿ scheme of dependence￿(or
a ￿ model￿as the economist calls it) such as would be adequate as a
basis for prediction and the analysis of requirements for stabilisation.
...
My own conclusion is that the representation by a reasonably
accurate analogue of any of the schemes of dependence that have
so far been proposed by economists presents no inherently insuper-
able problems, though it provides a su¢ cient spice of di¢ culty to
make the problem interesting. I think it is for the economists to say
whether such a project, if it were realised, would be of value. If it
were I am sure that there are many engineers skilled in the ￿eld of
analogue devises who would be glad to help transform the suggestion
into reality."
[32], pp. 85, 89
In the intervening six decades, or so, since Tustin￿ s ￿ conclusion￿and ￿ sug-
gestion￿ , the economist has abandoned the engineer and pawned the subject to
the mathematician ￿and not just any mathematician, but to the kinds whose
foundations are most alien to computation. How can the economist reclaim the
analogue vision, to return to thinking in terms of ￿ schemes of dependence￿ , and
to construct machine models that place at the centre of concern ￿ the analysis
of requirements for stabilisation￿ , without ideological anchorings in a political
economy of nihilism?
12Paradoxically, my own diagnosis of the malaise in current mathematical eco-
nomics is rooted in a critique of its recent obsession with computation and the
halo surrounding numerical analysis. Computable General Equilibrium theory
lies at the core of the frontier research in macroeconomics in its guise as Recur-
sive Macroeconomics, whose ￿ scheme of dependences￿are formalised as Stochas-
tic Dynamic General Equilibrium schemes. Another strand of popular research
at the frontiers is the so-called agent-based economic ￿ scheme of dependences￿ ,
again underpinned by ￿and in ￿atheoretical computation schemes, but, in re-
ality, disciplined by (unconsciously) recursion theory. Varieties of experimental
economics, algorithmic game theory and a loose amalgam of subjects under the
umbrella phrase ￿ computational economics￿are all trying to do the impossible
￿i.e., to compute the uncomputable, decide the undecidable and complete the
incompleatable.
Why?
Only because there is an unbridgeable gap between the mathematics in which
the above economic sub-disciplines are theorized and that in which their compu-
tation lives are implemented. If you theorise in terms of real analysis, founded
on set theory plus the axiom of choice, but compute with the aid of a digital
computer, then the mathematical foundations of the latter ￿recursion theory
or constructive mathematics ￿creates the inevitable dissonance.
Surely there are two obvious ways to overcome this dissonance. One, to
return economic theory to its algorithmic roots and theorise in terms of con-
structive or computable mathematics, ab initio. Two, to retain the rich harvest
of results that have been obtained in economic theory, in the almost two and
a half centuries of sustained e⁄ort by a galaxy of economic theorists, by means
of returning to the tradition of formulating ￿ schemes of dependence￿ , free of al-
legiance to any kind of mathematics, and build analogue devices to represent
them in action.
This is the message I infer from the pioneering work, and aims, that went
into the construction, and operation, of the Phillips Machine.
There are eminent applied mathematicians and computer scientists who have
been seeking a model of computation that can resolve a di⁄erent dissonance:
that between computability theory and numerical analysis. Smale and his co-
workers are a distinguished example of this group. In their de￿ning work, [4],
they emphasise the following distinctions between computability theory and
numerical analysis:
"There is a substantial con￿ ict between theoretical computer sci-
ence and numerical analysis. These two subjects with common goals
have grown apart. For example, computer scientists are uneasy with
calculus, whereas numerical analysis thrives on it. On the other hand
numerical analysts see no use for the Turing machine.
The con￿ ict has at its roots another age-old con￿ict, that between
the continuous and the discrete. Computer science is oriented by the
digital nature of machines and by its discrete foundations given by
Turing machines. For numerical analysis, systems of equations and
13di⁄erential equations are central and this discipline depends heavily
on the continuous nature of the real numbers. ...
Use of Turing machines yields a unifying concept of the algorithm
well formalized. ....
The situation in numerical analysis is quite the opposite. Algo-
rithms are primarily a means to solve practical problems. There is
not even a formal de￿nition of algorithm in the subject. ....
A major obstacle to reconciling scienti￿c computation and com-
puter science is the present view of the machine, that is, the digital
computer. As long as the computer is seen simply as a ￿nite or dis-
crete subject, it will be di¢ cult to systematize numerical analysis.
We believe that the Turing machine as a foundation for real number
algorithms can only obscure concepts.
Towards resolving the problem we have posed, we are led to ex-
panding the theoretical model of the machine to allow real numbers
as inputs."
[4], p.23; italics added.
Unfortunately, they fail to point out that also in constructive mathematics
￿ there is not even a formal de￿nition of algorithm in the subject￿ ; yet it can
act as the mathematical foundation for the digital computer without any of the
conundrums that an intermediary role for numerical analysis. But most para-
doxically, constructive mathematics can also act as an adequate mathematical
foundation for analog computation!
I think the ￿ con￿ ict￿Smale and others see between computer science and
numerical analysis, between the continuous and the discrete, between the ￿nite
and the in￿nite, are, in my opinion arti￿cial phantoms, created by the unholy
alliance between the metaphysics of the real number system and the spectre of
numerical analysis.
There is no better way to summarise the main theme in this paper than in
terms of the hilarious wisdom of Terry Pratchett in Making Money, p. 63
(italics added):
"The Glooper, as it is a⁄ectionately known, is what I call a quote
￿ analogy machine￿unquote. It solves problems not by considering
then as numerical exercise but by actually duplicating them in a form
we can manipulate: in this case, the ￿ ow of money and its e⁄ects
within our society becomes water ￿ owing through a glass matrix,
the Glooper."
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